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Abstract—Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic
(PV) systems are driving their increased installations by residen-
tial households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff,
net metering, net purchase and sale that allow the prosumers
to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering
this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems
among a community of households, who can also benefit further
by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we
find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net
total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint
net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants.
These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle.
The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and
promote PV solar aggregation. We also perform a comparative
analytical study on the benefit of sharing under the mechanisms
favorable for sharing, namely net metering, and net purchase
and sale. The results are illustrated in a case study using real
consumption data from a residential community in Austin, Texas.
Index Terms—Community solar, Solar PV aggregation, Net
metering, Net purchase and sale, Cost allocation based on cost
causation, Cooperative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Greater adoption of residential scale solar photovoltaic
renewable electric energy is a compelling engineering and
sustainability objective. Powered by (a) ongoing price reduc-
tions [1], (b) various types of subsidies [2], and (c) desire to
decarbonize the energy system [3], there has been dramatic
increase in rooftop solar PV installations. As residential users
install rooftop solar panels and generate portions of their
electricity needs, the need for fossil fuel based electric power
plants decreases. The total PV installations globally have
reached 300 GW by 2016 [4] of which about 28% are
decentralized grid connected. We are focused on develop-
ing techniques and tools that can further increase the cost-
effectiveness of rooftop solar PV installations.
Three main billing programs around the world enable
homeowners to sell their PV electricity to the grid: feed-in-
tariff, net metering, and net purchase and sale [5]. Some
utilities consider these programs as a threat to their business
models [6]. On the other hand, socio-economic-environmental
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policies surrounding climate change have led various govern-
ments to encourage such programs.
In this paper, we investigate how sharing the electricity
generated by rooftop PV in a cooperative manner can further
facilitate their adoption by decreasing overall energy costs. We
assume that the rooftop solar panels are electrically connected
with each other and the necessary hardware for electricity
sharing has been installed. Sharing economy has been a
huge success in housing and transportation sectors in recent
times [7]. It has been propelled by the desire to leverage under-
utilized infrastructures in existing houses and cars. Companies
like Uber, Lyft, AirBnB, VRBO made large impacts in trans-
portation and housing sectors [8]. In the electricity sector, there
is some research on modeling resource sharing. Cooperation
and aggregation of renewable energy sources bidding in the
two settlement market to maximize expected and realized
profit has been analyzed using cooperative game theory [9],
[10]. Cooperative game theoretic analysis of multiple demand
response aggregators in a virtual power plant and their cost
allocation has been tackled in [11]. Sharing of storage firms
under a local spot market has been analyzed using non-
cooperative game theory [12].
Community solar projects, where a community scale solar
energy plant is developed and shared by many households,
are getting popular [13]. Various countries like Germany, Den-
mark, Australia, United Kingdom, United States are already
investing significantly in this type of projects [14]. Benefit
of shared solar PV under net metering has been studied in
[15]. To the best of our knowledge, sharing of PV systems in
a cooperative manner among different houses under various
billing schemes has not been investigated. Can cooperation
among rooftop PV systems reduce costs to prosumers under all
billing mechanisms? If the answer is affirmative, to encourage
and preserve cooperative sharing, it will be crucial to have a
just and reasonable allocation of the resulting cost reduction
or benefit increase to the participating individuals. These are
precisely the questions we analyze in this paper.
Our results show that there is no advantage for cooperation
in the case of feed-in tariff. Using cooperative game theory, we
derive a necessary and sufficient condition on pricing under
which cooperation is advantageous for the participating pro-
sumers in net metering, and net purchase and sale mechanisms.
We develop rules for allocating joint cost based on the cost
causation principle [16]. We prove that these cost allocation
rules also follow standalone cost principle –i.e., they are in
the core of the cooperative games of net electricity consump-
tion costs. Next, we conduct a comparative study about the
cooperation benefits under net metering, and net purchase and
sale mechanisms. These results provide theoretical basis for
sharing of rooftop PV generation among prosumers. We also
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develop a case study based on real consumption and generation
data of a residential community in Austin, Texas, to illustrate
our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formulate the problem, introduce notation and
describe the system model. In Section III, we review basic
results on cooperative game theory and cost allocation based
on cost causation that are used in the derivation of the results.
In Section IV, we report our main results on aggregation of PV
solar energy. A case study to illustrate the theoretical results
is presented in Section V. Finally, we conclude our work in
Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a residential community of N households with PV
systems, that is represented by the set N = {1, 2, . . . , N}. The
retail price of electricity consumption for the set of households
is λ. They can also sell their electricity generation at price
µ. Both λ and µ are decided by the utility operating under
the system operators based on different factors, policies and
countries regulations [5]. We consider three programs: feed-
in tariff, net metering, and net purchase and sale that allow
households to sell their generated electricity to the grid. These
three mechanisms are explained in detail in [5], indicating
their countries of usage and also analyzing their impact on
social welfare. In the sequel, and in order to improve clarity
of the presentation, we shall consider that the prices λ and
µ do not change during each billing period. However, our
results could be easily extended to an scenario of either time-
of-use (TOU) tariffs or dynamic prices at the expense of a
burdensome notation. We also assume here that the households
obtain more utility than their cost for solar generation and thus
rationally install solar panels.
In feed-in tariff program, the households can sell all of
their PV generation at price µ and they must purchase all of
their consumed electricity from the grid at price λ. In contrast,
under the programs net metering, and net purchase and sale,
electric utility of the grid purchases only the net amount
of the PV generation of the households that exceeds their
consumption. But the two programs compute their net electric-
ity consumption and generation in different ways. Under net
metering program, when the PV generation of a household
exceeds its consumption, the electric meter runs backwards.
At the end of a billing period, if the amount of electricity
generation is more than consumption, the household is paid
for the net PV generation at price µ. If the amount of electricity
generation is less than consumption, the household has to pay
the net amount consumed at price λ. Under net purchase and
sale program, the generation and consumption is compared
at each time and the PV generated electricity is fed into the
system actually when generation exceeds consumption and
purchased by the utility at price µ. Otherwise, the consumed
electricity is purchased by the household at price λ. So the
amount of electricity is compared moment by moment in this
program instead of at the end of a billing period as in the net
metering program.
Let us consider a billing period [t0, tf ] of duration T =
tf − t0. For the i-th household at time t ∈ [t0, tf ], let the
electricity consumption be qi(t), and the generation by rooftop
solar panels be gi(t).
The net electricity consumption cost of the household for
the entire billing period is:
Cbi = λQ
b
i − µGbi , (1)
where Qbi and G
b
i denote the i-th household’s energy consump-
tion and generation during the billing period for the billing
mechanism b, respectively. These quantities are computed in
a different way depending on the billing mechanism.
For feed-in tariff mechanism (b = FiT):
QFiTi =
∫ tf
t0
qi(t)dt, G
FiT
i =
∫ tf
t0
gi(t)dt. (2)
For net metering mechanism (b = NM):
QNMi =
(∫ tf
t0
qi(t)dt−
∫ tf
t0
gi(t)dt
)
+
, (3)
GNMi =
(∫ tf
t0
gi(t)dt−
∫ tf
t0
qi(t)dt
)
+
. (4)
For net purchase and sale mechanism (b = NPS):
QNPSi =
∫ tf
t0
(qi(t)− gi(t))+dt, (5)
GNPSi =
∫ tf
t0
(gi(t)− qi(t))+dt. (6)
Note that the net consumption for each household i ∈ N is
obtained as
Di = Q
b
i −Gbi , (7)
and has the same value for the three billing mechanisms, but
the cost Cbi is different and depends on the billing mechanism
b ∈ {FiT,NM,NPS}.
Let S ⊆ N denote a coalition of households that decide
to cooperate to share their electricity generation by rooftop
solar panels and save electricity costs. We assume that the
rooftop solar panels are electrically connected with each other
and the houses also have necessary hardwares for electricity
sharing. The total energy consumption and generation of the
coalition for the interval [t0, tf ] and the billing mechanism
b are denoted as QbS and G
b
S , respectively. The consumption
is charged at price λ and the generation is paid at price µ,
which are assumed to be constant during the billing period.
Consequently, the cost of the coalition for the time interval
[t0, tf ] is
CbS = λQ
b
S − µGbS , (8)
where the expressions of QbS and G
b
S depend on the billing
mechanism b ∈ {FiT,NM,NPS}.
Cooperation is advantageous for the set N of households
under the billing mechanism b if the joint electricity cost CbS
is a subadditive function, i.e. if for any any pair of disjoint
coalitions {(S, T ) : S, T ⊆ N}, CbS∪T ≤ CbS + CbT . We
are interested in studying under which billing mechanisms
and what conditions, cooperation is advantageous. Moreover,
if cooperation produce some benefit, we want to develop
mechanisms to allocate it among the households in a way that
is satisfactory for all of them. These questions can be formally
answered using cooperative game theory.
III. BACKGROUND ON COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY FOR
COST SHARING AND ALLOCATION
Game theory deals with rational behavior of economic
agents in a mutually interactive setting [17]. Cooperative
games (or coalitional games) have been used extensively in
diverse disciplines such as social science, economics, phi-
losophy, psychology and communication networks [18], [19].
Here, we focus on cooperative games for cost sharing [20].
We explain the theory with the setup and notation of our solar
PV aggregation problem.
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , N} denote a finite collection of
players. In a cooperative game for cost sharing, the players
want to minimize their joint cost and share the resulting cost
cooperatively.
Definition 1 (Coalition): A coalition is any subset S ⊆ N .
The number of players in a coalition S is denoted by its
cardinality, |S|. The set of all possible coalitions is defined
as the power set 2N of N . The grand coalition is the set of
all players, N .
Definition 2 (Game and Cost): A cooperative game is
defined by a pair (N , C) where C : 2N → R is the cost
function that assigns a real value to each coalition S ⊆ N .
Hence, the cost of the coalition S is given by CS = C(S).
Definition 3 (Subadditive Game): A cooperative game
(N , C) is subadditive if, for any pair of disjoint coalitions
S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅, we have CS + CT ≥ CS∪T .
Here we consider the value of the coalition CS is trans-
ferable among players. The central question for a subadditive
cost sharing game with transferrable value is how to fairly
distribute the coalition value among the coalition members.
Definition 4 (Cost Allocation): A cost allocation for the
coalition S ⊆ N is a vector x ∈ RN whose entry xi represents
the allocation to member i ∈ S (xi = 0, i /∈ S).
For any coalition S ⊆ N , let xS denote the sum of cost
allocations for every coalition member, i.e. xS =
∑
i∈S xi.
Definition 5 (Imputation): A cost allocation x for the grand
coalition N is said to be an imputation if it is simultane-
ously budget balanced –i.e. CN =
∑N
i=1 xi, and individually
rational –i.e. Ci ≥ xi,∀i ∈ N . Let I denote the set of all
imputations.
The fundamental solution concept for cooperative games is
the core [17].
Definition 6 (The Core): The core C for the cooperative
game (N , C) with transferable cost is defined as the set of
cost allocations such that no coalition can have cost which is
lower than the sum of the members current costs under the
given allocation.
C := {x ∈ I : CS ≥ xS ,∀S ∈ 2N} . (9)
A classical result in cooperative game theory, known as
Bondareva-Shapley theorem, gives a necessary and sufficient
condition for a game to have nonempty core. To state this
theorem, we need the following definition.
Definition 7 (Balanced Game and Balanced Map): A co-
operative game (N , C) for cost sharing is balanced if for
any balanced map α,
∑
S∈2N α(S)CS ≥ CN where the map
α : 2N → [0, 1] is said to be balanced if for all i ∈ N ,
we have
∑
S∈2N α(S)1S(i) = 1, where 1S is the indicator
function of the set S, i.e. 1S(i) = 1 if i ∈ S and 1S(i) = 0
if i 6∈ S.
Next we state the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
Theorem 1 (Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [19]): A coali-
tional game has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.
There are a number of solutions that exist for a cooperative
game. The most prominent are the Shapley value, the nucleolus
[18] and the minimum worst-case excess allocation [9]. If a
game is balanced, the nucleolus and the minimum worst-case
excess are always in the core. For a concave cost sharing game,
the Shapley value is also in the core. These allocations are
computationally costly for large number of players. In order
to circumvent this problem and also to analyse properties of
an allocation, we proposed in [16] an axiomatic framework to
characterize just and reasonable cost allocation rules. These
axioms are: equity, monotonicity, individual rationality, budget
balance, and standalone cost principle. These axioms are
established using a variable that characterizes the cause of cost
of an agent. For the problem of allocation of the aggregated
cost of a group of households, the net individual consumption
Di = Q
b
i −Gbi for i ∈ N is a natural choice for the variable
that characterizes the cause of cost. Then, we establish the
following axioms.
Axiom 1 (Equity): If two agents i and j have same net
consumptions, the allocated costs must be the same i.e., if
Di = Dj then xi = xj .
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity): If two agents i and j have net
consumptions of the same sign, and agent i has a higher
net consumption than agent j, then the absolute value of the
allocated cost to i must be higher than the absolute value of
the allocated cost to j i.e., if DiDj ≥ 0 and |Di| ≥ |Dj | then
|xi| ≥ |xj |.
Axiom 3 (Individual Rationality): The allocated cost must
be less than the cost if the agent would not have joined the
aggregation i.e., xi ≤ Ci.
Axiom 4 (Budget Balance): The cost allocation rule would
be such that the sum of allocated costs must be equal to the
net electricity consumption cost i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = CN .
Axiom 5 (Standalone Cost Principle): For every coalition
S ⊂ N ,
xS ≤ CS . (10)
From Axiom 5 and Definition 6, it is easy to see that an
allocation that satisfies the standalone cost principle belongs
to the core of the cooperative game of cost sharing.
A cost causation based allocation was inspired by the tariffs
proposed by Kirby in [21] and should follow the axioms of
equity, monotonicity, individual rationality and budget balance,
but not necessarily the standalone cost principle. However, not
every allocation rule satisfying these four axioms follows the
cost causation principle, because they do not explicitly take
into account whether agents are causing or mitigating costs.
Using again the net individual consumption Di for i ∈ N
as the variable signaling cause or mitigation of cost, we state
the following cost causation axioms.
Definition 8 (Cost causation and mitigation): Let DN be
the net consumption of a group N of agents. It is said that
agent i is causing cost if Di > 0, and is mitigating cost if
Di < 0.
Based on this definition, we introduce two new cost causa-
tion based axioms: penalty for cost causation and reward for
cost mitigation.
Axiom 6 (Penalty for causing cost): Those individuals
causing cost should pay for it, i.e. xi > 0 for any i ∈ N
such that Di > 0.
Axiom 7 (Reward for cost mitigation): Those individuals
mitigating cost should be rewarded, i.e. xi < 0 for any i ∈ N
such that Di < 0.
Using the previously introduced axioms, a cost causation
based allocation rule is formally defined as follows.
Definition 9 (Cost causation based allocation rule): A cost
allocation rule is said to be a cost causation based allocation
rule if it satisfies Axioms 1–4 and 6–7.
It is interesting to remark that some well-known allocation
rules such as the proportional rule, or the Shapley value, do
not satisfy the cost causation axioms [16].
IV. MAIN RESULTS ON SOLAR ENERGY AGGREGATION
AND COST ALLOCATION UNDER DIFFERENT BILLING
MECHANISMS
In this section, we present the main results about cooper-
ation of households for different billing programs. We study
the conditions for each billing program to provide successful
cooperation.
A. Feed-in tariff
For the coalition S ⊆ N , under the feed-in tariff program,
the net consumption during the billing period [t0, tf ] is
DS = QFiTS −GFiTS , (11)
where
QFiTS =
∑
i∈S
QFiTi , G
FiT
S =
∑
i∈S
GFiTi , (12)
and QFiTi , G
FiT
i are given by equations (2).
Let us consider two disjoint coalitions S and T . For this
billing program, the cost of the coalition S is
CFiTS = λQ
FiT
S − µGFiTS . (13)
It is easy to see that CFiTS + C
FiT
T = C
FiT
S∪T . So cooperation
is neutral and there is no advantage or harm in cooperating
and sharing the PV generation. However, since there is likely
to be some cost for enabling cooperation, this result suggests
that FiT will not encourage cooperation.
B. Net Metering
The aggregated consumption and generation for any coali-
tion S ⊆ N during the billing period [t0, tf ] under the net
metering program are given by
QNMS =
(∑
i∈S
∫ tf
t0
qi(t)dt−
∑
i∈S
∫ tf
t0
gi(t)dt
)
+
, (14)
GNMS =
(∑
i∈S
∫ tf
t0
gi(t)dt−
∑
i∈S
∫ tf
t0
qi(t)dt
)
+
. (15)
The net consumption of the coalition is
DS = QNMS −GNMS , (16)
and the joint cost of the net consumption for the coalition is
CNMS = λQ
NM
S − µGNMS . (17)
Let (N , CNM) denote the cooperative game for the set of
of households under the net metering billing program. In
the following theorem, we obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for the game (N , CNM) to be subadditive and
balanced.
Theorem 2: The cooperative game (N , CNM) is subadditive
and balanced if and only if λ ≥ µ.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Remark 1: The condition λ ≥ µ developed in Theorem 2
requires that the selling price of the generated electricity is
always less that the retail price of the electricity. This price
condition is indeed realistic because the price of consuming
electricity should include generation, transmission and distri-
bution costs. But transmission and distribution costs should
not be included in the price that the utility pays for the energy
generated by a prosumer having solar PV systems [22].
Remark 2: Subadditivity of the game means that the
households may obtain benefit by aggregation, because the
aggregated cost is always less than or equal to the sum of
the individual costs. Balancedness means that the core of the
game is nonempty and there exists a cost allocation of the
aggregated cost that is satisfactory for every member of the
grand coalition. However, the existence of such an allocation
does not imply that it can be easily computed. Under the
pricing condition of Theorem 2, we propose the following easy
to compute cost allocation for grand coalition participants.
Allocation 1 (Net Metering): The allocated cost during the
billing interval [t0, tf ] for the i-th household of a residential
community N that share energy under the net metering
program is given by
xNMi =
{
λDi, if DN ≥ 0,
µDi, if DN < 0,
(18)
for every i ∈ N .
In Theorem 3, we prove that Allocation 1 is a cost causation
based cost allocation –i.e., it satisfies equity, monotonicity,
individual rationality, budget balance, penalty for causing cost
and reward for cost mitigation axioms.
Theorem 3: The allocation defined by (18) is a cost causa-
tion based allocation.
Proof: See Appendix. 
In addition, Allocation 1 satisfies the standalone cost prin-
ciple. This means that it is, in fact, a cost allocation in the
core of the cooperative game, and no rational household has
an incentive to defect from the grand coalition, because in that
case its electricity bill would increase. The result is stated as
the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The allocation defined by (18) satisfies stan-
dalone cost principle.
Proof: See Appendix. 
C. Net Purchase and Sale
The cost of the aggregated net consumption of a coalition
S ⊆ N during the billing period [t0, tf ] under the net purchase
and sale program is
CNPSS =
∫ tf
t0
CNPSS (t)dt. (19)
The instantaneous cost function CNPSS (t) is defined as follows:
CNPSS (t) = λQ
NPS
S (t)− µGNPSS (t), (20)
where
QNPSS (t) = (
∑
i∈S
qi(t)−
∑
i∈S
gi(t))+, (21)
GNPSS (t) = (
∑
i∈S
gi(t)−
∑
i∈S
qi(t))+, (22)
and the instantaneous net consumption at time t is
DS(t) = QNPSS (t)−GNPSS (t). (23)
The net purchase and sale is equivalent to the net metering
where the billing period reduces to the time instant t ∈ [t0, tf ].
Thus, for this billing mechanism, the study has to be accom-
plished instantaneously, instead of after completing the billing
period [t0, tf ]. Consequently, the definitions and axioms of
Section III are also valid, but they should be considered for
each time instant t ∈ [t0, tf ].
Let (N , CNPS) denote the cooperative game for the set of
households and the billing period [t0, tf ] under the net pur-
chase and sale program. A necessary and sufficient condition
for the successful cooperation of the group of households is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The cooperative game (N , CNPS) is subadditive
and balanced if and only if λ ≥ µ.
Proof: See Appendix.
Motivated by the properties of Allocation 1 for the net
metering case, we propose the following cost allocation for
the net purchase and sale program.
Allocation 2 (Net Purchase and Sale): The allocated cost
during the the billing time interval [t0, tf ] for the i-th house-
hold of a residential community N that share energy under
the net purchase and sale program in given by
xNPSi =
∫ tf
t0
xNPSi (t)dt, (24)
where
xNPSi (t) =
{
λDi(t), if DN (t) ≥ 0,
µDi(t), if DN (t) ≤ 0. (25)
The properties of Allocation 2 are established in the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 6: The allocation defined by equations (24)–(25)
is a cost causation based allocation that belongs to the core of
the cooperative game (N , CNPS).
Proof: See Appendix.
D. Comparative Study of Billing Mechanisms
Previously in this section, we proved that net metering,
and net purchase and sale billing mechanisms promote solar
PV aggregation and thus, renewable energy integration. Here,
we are interested in quantifying which of these mechanisms
is better from the point of view of the total cost that the
prosumers pay and save as a result of sharing.
We show that the prosumers pay less under a net metering
program than under a net purchase and sale program with the
same prices λ and µ. The result is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 7: Let S ⊆ N be any coalition of prosumers.
Assume that λ and µ with λ ≥ µ are the price of purchasing
and selling electricity. The cost of the electricity consumption
of the coalition is less under a net metering program than
under a net purchase and sale program, and the difference is
given by
CNPSS − CNMS =
{
(λ− µ)GNPSS , if DS ≥ 0,
(λ− µ)QNPSS , if DS < 0.
(26)
Proof: See Appendix. 
The result is valid for any coalition and therefore it applies
also to individual prosumers. Next, we are interested in study-
ing if one of these programs is better in savings than the other
under aggregation. We show that, under certain conditions, the
net purchase and sale program produces a larger cost savings
than the net metering program.
The aggregated cost of the grand coalition N under net
metering program is:
CNMN = λQ
NM
N − µGNMN , (27)
and the cost allocated to the household i ∈ N using Alloca-
tion 1 is:
xNMi =
{
λDi, if DN ≥ 0,
µDi, if DN < 0.
(28)
The cost of the household i ∈ N when it is not sharing
solar energy with the other households is:
CNMi =
{
λDi, if Di ≥ 0,
µDi, if Di < 0.
(29)
Thus, the cost saving that household i ∈ N obtains by
aggregating with the other households in the community N
for the billing period [t0, tf ] is
SNMi = C
NM
i − xNMi
=
{
0, if DiDN ≥ 0,
(λ− µ)|Di|, if DiDN < 0. (30)
An analogous analysis for the net purchase and sale program
provides the instantaneous cost saving that the household i ∈
N obtains at time instant t ∈ [t0, tf ] by aggregation:
SNPSi (t) = C
NPS
i (t)− xNPSi (t)
=
{
0, if Di(t)DN (t) ≥ 0,
(λ− µ)|Di(t)|, if Di(t)DN (t) < 0. (31)
For each household i ∈ N , we define the time sets:
Ω+i = {t ∈ [t0, tf ] : Di(t)DN (t) ≥ 0}, (32)
Ω−i = {t ∈ [t0, tf ] : Di(t)DN (t) < 0}. (33)
Then the cost saving that the household i ∈ N obtains by
aggregation for the billing period [t0, tf ] is:
SNPSi =
∫ tf
t0
SNPSi (t)dt
=
∫
Ω+i
SNPSi (t)dt+
∫
Ω−i
SNPSi (t)dt
= (λ− µ)
∫
Ω−i
|D(t)|dt. (34)
The difference in the cost savings for the household i ∈ N
under the two billing mechanisms is given by
SNPSi − SNMi ={
(λ− µ) ∫
Ω−i
|D(t)|dt, if DiDN ≥ 0,
(λ− µ)
(∫
Ω−i
|D(t)|dt− |Di|
)
, if DiDN < 0.
(35)
Using the equations (30) and (35), we obtain that SNPSi ≥
SNMi = 0 for each billing period where DiDN ≥ 0. This
means that, in this case, cooperation is only advantageous
under the net purchase and sale program. However, for a
billing period where the individual net consumption and the
net consumption of the grand coalition have opposite sign –
i.e. DiDN ≤ 0, we cannot say anything about which program
produces a greater cost saving for a household, and it depends
on the particular consumption patterns. In a practical scenario
considering household’s electricity requirements, rooftop solar
capacity, solar insolation, etc., for most of the billing periods,
the households have positive individual net consumptions –i.e.
they consume more electricity than they generate. As a result,
the grand coalition also has a positive net consumption. Thus,
for most of the billing periods and most of the households, the
net purchase and sale program produce greater cost savings
than the net metering program.
E. Billing Mechanisms Around The World
Different countries use different billing mechanisms to
promote solar PV adoption [5]. Germany adopted feed-in-
tariff, which is not advantageous for prosumers with sharing
PV systems. Most states in the USA use net metering with
λ = µ. Japan uses net purchase and sale but in their case
µ ≥ λ. None of these billing mechanisms are advantageous
for sharing. A high selling price µ ≥ λ makes solar PV very
attractive for prosumers because it produces large reduction in
electricity bills. However, this policy is harmful for utilities
that have to buy the generated energy by the households at a
higher price than the market price as it includes transmission
and distribution costs [22]. It is expected that as the number of
households with rooftop solar PV increases, the selling price
of the PV generated electricity approaches the price that the
utility pays for buying electricity in the market minus the
transmission and distribution costs. Thus, in future, µ will
be less than the retail price of electricity λ, and this will
promote aggregation as a means to reduce consumption cost
and integrate more renewable energy by taking advantage of
the solar PV excess.
Recently, legislators of Nevada introduced a new compen-
sation [23] for excess solar energy exported to the grid at 95
percent of the retail electricity rate. For every 80 megawatts
of solar deployed, the export credit is set to decline by 7
percent, to a floor of 75 percent of the retail rate. NV Energy
also sought to have the 95 percent calculation apply to every
kilowatt-hour of energy a prosumer exports to the grid, rather
than the monthly netting amount, a change that decreases the
value prosumers get for the energy they export. It is favorable
for cooperation as λ is greater than µ. Also the scheme reduces
the value for the prosumer as calculations does not wait for
monthly netting amount, rather depends upon some energy
consumption. The mechanism is closer to net purchase and
sale and as per our analysis in this section, the sharing PV
systems in this mechanism might probably give more overall
advantage to prosumers compared to net metering, though the
real advantage will depend on net consumption of a particular
prosumer, as well as that of the whole cooperative group.
V. A CASE STUDY
We consider a community of 80 households, located in a
residential area of Austin, TX, that have PV rooftop panels
and decide to share their generation. The consumption and
generation data have been obtained from the Pecan Street
project [24]. The codes of the 80 prosumers selected for this
study are given in Table I. For each prosumer we have retrieved
real data of power consumption and solar power generation
for every 15 minutes. The period under study is the complete
year of 2016, and the billing period is one month. As we have
analytically proved that there is no advantage of sharing under
feed-in tariff, in this study, we only analyze the impact on cost
and savings in sharing PV systems under net metering, and net
purchase and sale.
A. Data Analysis
We have considered λ = ¢11.02/kW and µ = 0.57λ1.
In Figure 1, we show the daily average consumption per
household in black solid line. The shaded light blue area
represents the interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of
the consumption distribution of the community prosumers. We
have chosen four specific dates in different seasons. These
1λ is the average retail price of electricity in Texas during 2016, obtained
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Data Browser [25], and µ
corresponds exclusively to the generation part of the retail price of electricity
in the US according to the Annual Energy Outlook 2017 [26].
TABLE I
CODES OF THE 80 PROSUMERS USED IN THE STUDY
Prosumers’ Codes
26 77 93 171 370 379 545 585 624 744
781 890 1283 1415 1697 1792 1800 2072 2094 2129
2199 2233 2557 2818 2925 2945 2980 3044 3310 3367
3456 3482 3538 3649 4154 4352 4373 4447 4767 4874
5035 5129 5218 5357 5403 5658 5738 5785 5874 5892
6061 6063 6578 7024 7030 7429 7627 7719 7793 7940
7965 7989 8046 8059 8086 8156 8243 8419 8645 8829
8995 9001 9134 9235 9248 9647 9729 9937 9971 9982
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Fig. 1. Daily average load
dates are 2016-01-01, 2016-04-01, 2016-07-01 and 2016-10-
01. Since each prosumer has PV rooftop panel, the daily
average solar power generation per prosumer is depicted in
Figure 2 in black solid line for the same specific dates. In
addition, the light blue solid lines are the power generation
curves for every prosumer in the community.
The total electricity consumption of the community dur-
ing 2016 is 971 681 MW h and the total generation is
598 349 MW h. The monthly total consumption and gener-
ation for the 80 prosumers is given in Table II. Notice that
consumption is larger in summer and fall months because
of the use of air conditioners. In these months the solar
generation also increases but not at the same rate as that of
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Fig. 2. Daily Solar PV generation
TABLE II
COMMUNITY MONTHLY TOTAL CONSUMPTION AND GENERATION
Month (a) (b) (a)–(b)
1 56 807.87 44 503.73 12 304.14
2 48 200.62 52 105.83 −3905.21
3 52 714.26 52 944.47 −230.21
4 60 270.83 51 398.36 8872.47
5 77 184.61 48 118.61 29 066.00
6 113 583.74 61 418.20 52 165.54
7 134 202.32 66 716.79 67 485.52
8 119 990.42 54 610.72 65 379.69
9 109 313.42 54 128.38 55 185.04
10 83 020.00 53 773.55 29 246.45
11 55 200.10 33 601.74 21 598.36
12 61 193.50 25 028.61 36 164.89
Total 971 681.68 598 348.98 373 332.69
(a) Energy Consumption kWh
(b) Energy Generation kWh
the consumptions. The consumption increase from January to
July is 236% while the generation increase is only 150%. The
net consumption of the community in February and March is
negative.
The average monthly consumption and generation per pro-
sumer is 1012.17 kW h and 623.28 kW h, respectively. The
distribution of the monthly community consumption and gen-
eration are depicted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. We show
two plots for each figure. The first plot represents the distri-
bution of consumption and generation per prosumer, while the
second one is the distribution of consumption and generation
per month. The average value is represented by a solid black
line with round marks. The interquantile interval between 5%
and 95% is shown as a light blue bar. The remaining 10%
cases are shown as dark blue bars. We can see that most
residents have monthly energy consumptions near the average
value with some seasonal variation. There are two residents
(codes 5357 and 9647 corresponding to positions 44 and 76
in the horizontal axis) with average monthly consumptions
near to 3000 kW h, much higher than the rest of residents.
The plots of the rooftop PV solar generation distribution show
that the monthly generation is near to the average value of
623.28 kW h with some seasonal variation. As it is expected,
the generation is higher during June and July because there are
more insolation hours and lower in November and December.
B. Results
We analyze now the cost of energy for each resident depend-
ing on the billing mechanism2. In both the cases, we show a
table with the sum of the costs for the 80 households for each
month and a figure with the distribution of the monthly cost
of electricity. We include two plots in this figure. The first plot
represents the monthly cost distribution per prosumer, while
the second one is the prosumer cost per month. The average
value is represented by a solid black line with round marks.
The interquantile interval between 5% and 95% is shown as
2Notice that we are analyzing only the cost of the consumed energy. In
some European countries the cost of electricity has a term depending on the
contracted power and possible penalties for exceeding the contracted power.
We are not considering these terms but this does not detract from our study.
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Fig. 4. Community PV solar generation
a light blue bar. The remaining 10% cases are shown as dark
blue bars.
In Table III we show the costs for the net metering billing
mechanism. In this case, the total annual cost for the com-
munity is $42 973.74, corresponding to a monthly average per
household of $44.76. If the residents decide to share their
solar rooftop generation and allocate the costs according to
Allocation 1 (18), then the total annual cost is $41 337.22
corresponding to a monthly average cost per household of
$43.10 and a cost reduction of 3.96%.
The distribution of the monthly costs and savings are
depicted in Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 5 we show the monthly
cost distribution, while in Figure 5 we show the monthly
cost savings distribution. Note that the higher cost savings
are obtained in February and March. The reason is that the
net consumption in these months is negative, see Table II.
Finally, in Table IV, we show the savings for the households.
Due to space limitation we only show the 20 prosumers that
obtain higher annual savings. They are ordered in decreasing
order of the relative cost differences. There are 19 households
that obtain a reduction higher than 10%, 30 households that
obtain a reduction higher than 5% and only 7 households that
do not obtain any reduction.
We conducted a similar analysis for the net purchase and
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS FOR NET METERING (I)
Month (a) (b) (c) (d)
1 1570.02 1355.92 214.11 13.64
2 136.45 −245.30 381.75 279.78
3 404.29 −14.46 418.75 103.58
4 1253.37 977.75 275.62 21.99
5 3289.97 3203.07 86.90 2.64
6 5765.62 5748.64 16.97 0.29
7 7444.56 7436.90 7.66 0.10
8 7209.74 7204.84 4.89 0.07
9 6106.10 6081.39 24.71 0.40
10 3358.26 3222.96 135.30 4.03
11 2445.12 2380.14 64.98 2.66
12 3990.26 3985.37 4.89 0.12
Total 42 973.74 41 337.22 1636.52 3.96
(a) Cost without sharing ($) (b) Cost with sharing ($)
(c) Cost savings (a)–(b) ($) (d) Cost savings (c)/|(a)| (%)
0
100
200
300
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Cost (net metering)
Customer
$
0
100
200
300
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Cost (net metering)
Month
$
Fig. 5. Community cost for net metering billing mechanism
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Fig. 6. Community savings for net metering billing mechanism
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS FOR NET METERING (II)
Prosumer (a) (b) (c) (d)
5218 −3.84 −38.55 34.71 903.19
8645 −2.46 −20.54 18.07 733.38
2199 −4.48 −26.48 22.00 490.63
9937 10.15 −32.74 42.90 422.42
171 11.90 −28.52 40.42 339.60
3456 −20.98 −65.78 44.81 213.59
8995 −41.87 −101.66 59.79 142.80
8243 45.88 5.43 40.45 88.16
7024 34.27 5.24 29.02 84.70
8046 −86.57 −136.06 49.50 57.18
9971 137.10 85.52 51.59 37.63
5129 91.92 64.14 27.78 30.22
1800 129.89 93.65 36.24 27.90
9001 132.07 111.33 20.73 15.70
3538 122.99 104.27 18.73 15.23
5874 108.81 93.97 14.84 13.63
1792 168.54 146.88 21.66 12.85
1283 670.01 595.46 74.55 11.13
6063 209.11 188.03 21.08 10.08
2945 120.44 109.41 11.03 9.16
(a) Cost without sharing ($), (b) Cost with sharing ($)
(c) Cost savings (a)–(b) ($), (d) Cost savings (c)/|(a)| (%)
sale billing mechanism. In this case the cost savings by month
are shown in Table III. The annual cost for the community if
each household pay by her own net consumption is $55 609.93,
corresponding to a monthly average per household of $57.93.
If the residents decide to share their solar rooftop generation
and allocate the costs according to Allocation 2 (24)–(25),
then the total annual cost is $42 973.74 corresponding to a
monthly average cost per household of $44.76 and a relative
cost reduction of 22.72%.
The distribution of the monthly costs and savings are
depicted in Figures 7 and 8. As was analytically explained
in Section IV-D- in this case the cost savings are much
higher than for the net metering billing mechanism. Moreover,
unlike that case, the higher savings are not concentrated
in two months and for a small number of prosumers. In
Table VI, we show the savings for the households. Similarly
to the net metering case, we only show the 20 prosumers
that obtain higher annual savings and they are ordered in
decreasing order of the relative cost savings. Every household
obtains a significant reduction of her energy cost. There are
21 households that obtain a reduction higher than 50%, 52
households obtain a reduction higher than 20%, 70 higher than
10% and only one has a reduction lower than 1%.
We could also validate our comparative analysis between
the mechanisms. Net metering produces lower costs for the
households than net purchase and sale. But from the point
of view of saving cost due to sharing, net purchase and
sale is the most interesting as it promotes association by
an effective sharing of the energy excesses and producing
significant reduction of the energy costs for every household.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Drastic cost reduction in the PV systems technology in
the last few years has resulted in significant increase in
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS FOR NET PURCHASE AND SALE
Month (a) (b) (c) (d)
1 2773.90 1570.02 1203.88 43.40
2 1336.72 136.45 1200.27 89.79
3 1694.22 404.29 1289.93 76.14
4 2500.15 1253.37 1246.78 49.87
5 4378.49 3289.97 1088.52 24.86
6 6802.61 5765.62 1036.99 15.24
7 8442.62 7444.56 998.06 11.82
8 8077.89 7209.74 868.15 10.75
9 7071.99 6106.10 965.89 13.66
10 4572.32 3358.26 1214.06 26.55
11 3353.83 2445.12 908.72 27.09
12 4605.20 3990.26 614.95 13.35
Total 55 609.93 42 973.74 12 636.18 22.72
(a) Cost without sharing ($) (b) Cost with sharing ($)
(c) Cost savings (a)–(b) ($) (d) Cost savings (c)/|(a)| (%)
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS FOR NET PURCHASE AND SALE (II)
Prosumer (a) (b) (c) (d)
8995 129.49 −41.87 171.37 132.34
8046 282.91 −86.57 369.47 130.60
3456 139.16 −20.98 160.14 115.07
2199 128.52 −4.48 133.00 103.49
5218 208.66 −3.84 212.50 101.84
8645 138.64 −2.46 141.11 101.78
9937 227.65 10.15 217.50 95.54
171 163.75 11.90 151.85 92.73
7024 213.38 34.27 179.12 83.94
8243 228.18 45.88 182.30 79.89
1800 446.96 129.89 317.07 70.94
3482 276.09 92.10 183.99 66.64
5129 253.90 91.92 161.98 63.80
781 416.68 167.39 249.29 59.83
9001 317.79 132.07 185.72 58.44
1792 385.18 168.54 216.64 56.24
5874 245.45 108.81 136.64 55.67
9971 304.19 137.10 167.08 54.93
6578 429.52 193.67 235.85 54.91
2945 261.49 120.44 141.05 53.94
(a) Cost without sharing ($) (b) Cost with sharing ($)
(c) Cost savings (a)–(b) ($) (d) Cost savings (c)/|(a)| (%)
their worldwide installation. Attractive billing methods imple-
mented by different system operators have also encouraged
more houses to install PV systems. In this paper, we have
explored the idea of sharing the electricity generation by
PV systems of different households among each other and
improving their profits promoting the use of clean energy
more in the power system. We considered sharing under
three different programs: feed-in tariff, net metering, and net
purchase and sale. In feed-in tariff, there is no advantage in
sharing. In net metering, and net purchase and sale, sharing
is advantageous if and only if the retail price of electricity by
the utility is more than the price of selling electricity to the
utility. Under that favorable sharing condition, we found rules
for allocating their joint cost based on cost causation principle.
The allocations also follow standalone cost principle - i.e.,
they are in the core of the cooperative games of net electricity
consumption cost. We have also performed a comparative
analysis between net metering, and net purchase and sale.
These results will definitely attract more households to share
their PV systems generated electricity with each other and as
a result, the whole society will benefit. We have verified our
developed results in the data set of a community of residential
households in Austin, Texas. The results show significant
advantage in sharing PV systems among prosumers.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Let us consider two disjoint coalitions S and T , then
CNMS∪T = λQ
NM
S∪T − µGNMS∪T ,
where
QNMS∪T = (Q
NM
S +Q
NM
T −GNMS −GNMT )+,
GNMS∪T = (G
NM
S +G
NM
T −QNMS −QNMT )+,
and
CNMS + C
NM
T = λ(Q
NM
S +Q
NM
T )− µ(GNMS +GNMT ).
In net metering mechanism QNMS ≥ 0, GNMS ≥ 0, and one
of them is always zero, i.e. QNMS G
NM
S = 0 for any coalition
S ⊆ N . Then we can distinguish four possible cases:
Case (I): GNMS = G
NM
T = 0,
CNMS∪T = λ(Q
NM
S +Q
NM
T ) = C
NM
S + C
NM
T .
Case (II): QNMS = Q
NM
T = 0,
CNMS∪T = −µ(GNMS +GNMT ) = CNMS + CNMT .
Case (III): GNMS = Q
NM
T = 0,
CNMS∪T = λ(Q
NM
S −GNMT )+ − µ(GNMT −QNMS )+,
CNMS + C
NM
T = λQ
NM
S − µGNMT .
We have two cases, either QNMS ≥ GNMT or QNMS < GNMT . In
both cases, CNMS∪T ≤ CNMS + CNMT if and only if µ ≤ λ.
Case (IV): QNMS = G
NM
T = 0,
CNMS∪T = λ(Q
NM
T −GNMS )+ − µ(GNMS −QNMT )+,
CNMS + C
NM
T = λQ
NM
T − µGNMS .
We have two cases, either QNMT ≥ GNMS or QNMT < GNMS . In
both cases, CNMS∪T ≤ CNMS + CNMT if and only if µ ≤ λ.
Thus, subadditivity of the cost function CNM of the coop-
erative game (N , CNM) is equivalent to λ ≥ µ.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
According to Definition 9, we have to prove that the cost
allocation rule given by (18) satisfies the Axioms 1–4 and 6–7.
Let Di = QNMi −GNMi be the net consumption. The allocation
follows the following axioms:
Axiom 1 (Equity): It is easy to see that if two households
i and j have same net consumptions, the allocated costs must
be the same i.e., if Di = Dj then xNMi = x
NM
j .
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity): Under the cost allocation rule
(18), if DiDj ≥ 0 and |Di| ≥ |Dj | then |xNMi | ≥ |xNMj |
and this proves Monotonicity.
Axiom 3 (Individual Rationality):
CNMi =
{
λQNMi , if Di ≥ 0,
−µGNMi , if Di < 0. (36)
Since λ ≥ µ, comparing (18) with (36) we can say that
the allocated cost will be less than the net consumption cost
if the household would not have joined the aggregation i.e.,
xNMi ≤ CNMi .
Axiom 4 (Budget Balance):
If DN ≥ 0:∑
i∈N
xNMi = +
∑
i∈N
λ(QNMi −GNMi ) = CNMN ,
If DN < 0:∑
i∈N
xNMi = −
∑
i∈N
µ(GNMi −QNMi ) = CNMN .
So the cost allocation rule is such that the sum of allocated
costs are equal to the total net electricity consumption cost
i.e., ∑
i∈N
xNMi = C
NM
N .
Recall from Definition 8 that a household i with positive
net consumption Di = QNMi is causing cost to the system and
with negative Di = −GNMi is mitigating cost to the system.
Axiom 6 (Penalty for causing cost): From (18), if Di =
QNMi ≥ 0, xNMi ≥ 0 i.e., those individuals causing cost will
pay for it.
Axiom 7 (Reward for cost mitigation): From (18), if Di =
−GNMi < 0, xNMi < 0 i.e., those individuals mitigating cost
will be rewarded. The rate of penalty and reward is same here.
And we conclude that the cost allocation defined by (18) is
a cost causation based allocation.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
In order to prove that the cost allocation rule satisfies the
standalone principle (Axiom 5), two cases are considered:
If DN ≥ 0:∑
i∈S
xNMi = λDS ,
CNMS = +λQ
NM
S , if DS ≥ 0,
CNMS = −µGNMS , if DS ≤ 0.
If DN ≤ 0:∑
i∈S
xNMi = µDS ,
CNMS = +λQ
NM
S , if DS ≥ 0,
CNMS = −µGNMS , if DS ≤ 0.
So from above, we can conclude that for every aggregation
S ⊆ N : ∑
i∈S
xNMi ≤ CNMS ,
and this proves that the cost allocation satisfies the standalone
cost principle.
D. Proof of Theorem 5
The cooperative game (N , CNPS) for the billing period
[t0, tf ] is subadditive if and only if the game (N , CNPS(t))
for t ∈ [t0, tf ] is subadditive. Since the instantaneous game
(N , CNPS(t)) is equivalent to a net metering coalitional game
for a billing period reduced to the time instant t, then by
Theorem 2, subadditivity is equivalent to λ ≥ µ.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
The cost allocation xNPSi (t) given by (25) satisfies Ax-
ioms 1–7 for the instantaneous cooperative game (N , CNPS(t))
where t ∈ [t0, tf ] because the game (N , CNPS(t)) is equivalent
to a net metering cooperative game where the billing interval
reduces to the time instant t. Thus, xNPSi =
∫ tf
t0
xNPSi (t)dt is
a cost causation based cost allocation that belongs to the core
of the cooperative game (N , CNPS) for the net purchase and
sale program.
F. Proof of Theorem 7
We consider two cases.
Case DS ≥ 0: There is nonnegative net consumption, then
DS = QNMS = Q
NPS
S − GNPSS . The cost of the coalition
consumption under Net metering and net purchase and sale
programs are:
CNMS = λDS = λQ
NPS
S − λGNPSS ,
CNPSS = λQ
NPS
S − µGNPSS .
Thus,
CNPSS − CNMS = (λ− µ)GNPSS .
Case DS < 0: There is positive net generation, then DS =
−GNMS = QNPSS −GNPSS . The cost of the coalition consumption
under net metering and net purchase and Sale programs are:
CNMS = µDS = µQ
NPS
S − µGNPSS ,
CNPSS = λQ
NPS
S − µGNPSS .
Thus,
CNPSS − CNMS = (λ− µ)QNPSS .
